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Introduction
For the purposes of this article it is taken for granted
that what occurred in South Korea (hereafter Korea)
between 1961 and 1979 was government-led growth.
Government-led in the sense that the government has,
as actor, been pervasive in every sector of the
economy. Moreover, government-led growth is taken
to mean that the rate of growth of Korea would not
have been so fast if the government had done less. (For
a discussion of how this was done see Jones and
SaKong [1980]; Michell [1984]; Westphal [1981].)
The picture of the Korean Government which has
gained wide acceptance since the work of Jones and
SaKong appeared is that of a hard and centralised
government, the 'hard state' being the opposite of the
South Asian 'soft state' which Gunnar Myrdal
identifies as a major problem in Asian development
[Myrdal 1968]. Other studies have assumed a
centralised hierarchical society [Wade 19821. These
studies draw (usually implicitly) on concepts of
Confucian society. The more the concept of a
homogenous, centralised hierarchy is endorsed, the
less need there is to pose the sort of analysis used in this
article. All policy descends from the Blue House (the
Presidential residence) and is with great promptness
put into effect by the comprehensive bureaucracy.
It is commonly held that a principle objection to a high
degree of state intervention in the economy is that civil
servants rarely know what is best for an economy.
How could the Koreans be right so often, especially in
what is often described as a hierarchical system [Jones
and SaKong 1980; Wade 1982]?
Here it is argued that a more careful analysis of the
bureaucratic traditions and the consequent patterns of
decision-making within the Korean state shows that
the way in which government decisions were often,
though not always, reached, involved a wide degree of
opinion-taking and modifications, and even formu-
lation of policy from the bottom rather than the top.
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While no system is foolproof, this potential for
consultation and modification at lower levels of the
administrative structure prevents the implementation
of many potentially damaging policies. At the same
time the strong drive from the top, especially in the
1960s, providing what Lewis calls 'the will to
economise' [Lewis 1966] injected a sense of urgency
and national purpose into a system which would easily
have become lethargic and corrupt. A key explanation
was the fact that Korean officials had a very clear aim
- Korea's economic national interest a yardstick
against which all else was measured.
Some of the grosser mistakes in Korean development
were in fact caused when this process was by-passed,
as in the implementation of the Heavy and Chemical
Industrial Plan of 1973 or where a different syste'n
prevailed, as in agriculture.
The central argument presented here is that there are
four processes of decision-making in action simul-
taneously within the formal, ie central government,
structure:
j) a hierarchical structure, in which decisions are
made at the top (the process normally described);
a reverse hierarchy in which decisions are made at
the bottom and validated at more senior levels;
an anarchic war of all against all in which
conflicting decisions are made at all levels with strong
competition between ministries;
competing with the formal decision-making
process is an informal one, which draws on traditional
values of a face to face society, the rule of men rather
than the rule of law [Kim Bun-woong 1982].
The Heritage of the Past
It is said of Japan that one of its characteristics is that
it has brought traditional values into the modern
world. What is strikingly lacking in the Korean case is
a consideration of precisely what South Korea has
inherited from its past. This is an outstanding
omission from the KDI/Harvard series on the
Modernisation of South Korea ¡945-75, which requires
rectification. The two clear values which Korea has
brought to the modern world are the strength of
personal relationships and the power and status of the
bureaucracy. These two values owe much not only to
traditional Korea, but, as will be argued, to the
colonial administration of the Japanese. Both cultures
are steeped in Confucianism, but very different
interpretations of it.
Confucianism is not uniform throughout East Asia.
Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and South East Asians
have found different values in the works of the Master.
The distinctiveness of Japanese Confucianism, as
compared with Chinese Confuciansism, has been
discussed [eg Morishima 1982], but in the English
language there has been only inadequate treatment of
the distinctiveness of Korean Confucianism [Palais
forthcoming]. Compared with Japan, Confucianism
has not strengthened Korean nationalism either in the
Yi dynasty or now. Whereas in Japan the key
confucian value of loyalty was focused - at least in
the higher levels of society - on the feudal lord or
territory and could be turned into loyalty to the
Emperor or the firm, in Korea loyalty was always
focused primarily on the family.
Korea in the l960s, 1970s and 1980s is, of course, sub
confucian. Knowledge of the confucian classics is
extremely limited and the traditional confucian
schools that continued a precarious existence into the
1960s have been by-passed by the all-intensive
pressure of the university entrance examination and
extra curricula pressures.
Confucianism therefore continues at a non-explicit
level in social customs and to the degree that confucian
values have been deliberately inserted into the
educational system. There is a further important point
which must be stressed. Koreans are brought up to be
deferential to elders and betters - deference to
position, age, sex, but not particularly to authority in
the abstract. Throughout the Yi dynasty there was a
strong appeal to the inner concept of what is right
(kunja li) rather than constituted authority. Moreover,
although the traditional Korean state had the
structure of a centralised and hierarchical state, it did
not function that way. The king was a prisoner of
ritualised procedure and within the carefully graded
hierarchical structure a large degree of autonomy was
given to specific officials. The real hierarchical
distinction was between yangban1 and others. Within
the elite a wide range of dissent and autonomy was
The rangban were the traditional elite, sometimes translated as
gentry, but actually holding theorettcal status by virtue of having
passed the civil service examination.
tolerated because all were kunja. Amongst the others
not even the slightest dissent was permitted.
Finally, although Koreans are taught to be deferential
to elders and betters and patronising towards
youngers and 'worsers', they never feel comfortable
when deferring. Confucian respect is based on tension,
and a major aim is to establish a relationship in which
a Korean can feel pyon ha da (comfortable, relaxed).
The only group in which this is possible is in the age
cohort or peer group. These tensions are apparent in
Japanese society and can partly be released through
the concept of amae, the possibility of relaxing in front
of superiors. Park was quick to point out that amae
was not unique to the Japanese, but that the concept
existed in Korea as well. It is essential to the workings
of a confucian society.
If the Yi dynasty heritage has been misunderstood, the
Japanese legacy has been ignored. The bureaucracy
was heir to the full veneration of Yi dynasty times in
which official office was the goal of every member of
the yangban class. But it is important to remember that
the old bureaucracy came to an end in 1910. The post
1945 bureaucracy was the successor, not of the Yi
dynasty bureaucracy but of the Japanese colonial
administration.
In 1945 those who had been junior officials in the
colonial administration moved up to all but
ministerial posts. The post 1945 bureaucracy was
therefore deeply imbued with Japanese administrative
values. This included a sense of corporate loyalty
which has lasted to the present day. A man is always an
EPB (Economic Planning Board) man, or an MCI
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry) man, even if he
changes ministries. This sense of corporate loyalty is
much stronger in government ministries than in any
other part of Korean life.
The opposition called for a trial of collaborators, but
such cries were swept aside. The Americans offered
many suggestions for administrative arrangements,
but few if any were adopted. It must be remembered
that the American administration lasted only from
1945-48 and had much less clear goals than in Japan.
Even in Japan they proved unable to change the
Japanese way of thinking, as is abundant in the
Yoshida memoirs [Dower 1978]. In Korea they did not
try, merely attempting to set up a viable government
when many of the political leaders were excluded.
Even if it can be shown that the Americans tried hard
- and the definitive history of the American
occupation has yet to be written - the linguistic
barrier prevented effective communication of ideas
and bureaucratic moves. Perhaps the most striking
example was the foundation of the MCI. In Japan the
Americans were determined to destroy this ministry,
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creating a rapid contraction and a renaming to
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
Chalmers Johnson has recently shown the extent to
which this aim was perverted by the existing staff
[Johnson 19821.
In Korea MCI retained the same Chinese characters as
the abolished Japanese ministry. How little the
incoming government understood how the bureau-
cracy worked can be seen from Syngman Rhee's
appointment of Louise Yim as first Minister of MCI.
When Yim protested she know nothing of trade or
industry, Rhee is supposed to have replied 'actually,
the Minister does not have to run the industries or
business of Korea. The Minister has to inspire greater
production and get foreign investments into the
country. The people would listen to you and work for
you and your foreign contacts would be useful'.
This was not the way MCI officials thought, and they
proceeded to run the country as it had been run in the
past. This heritage was primarily that of the wartime
economy, full of administrative guidance and
government regulation. The 1948 Constitution gave
the government sweeping powers to run the economy
and MCI was trained to use those powers. So too, in
agriculture. During the wartime economy 1937-45, the
Japanese had built up an all-powerful Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries which reached into the very
roots of the countryside through the National
Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF).
Thus in the case of two of the four overlord ministries
of the post-1961 era the groundrules followed the
Japanese model from the beginning. The same was
true of the Ministry of Transport, even down to MOT
running tourism because Chosun Railways had been
run by South Manchurian Railways which had been
responsible for tourism. The Ministry of Communi-
cations inherited the postal system, the Monopoly
Office the salt, ginseng and tobacco monopolies, the
Ministry of Home Affairs inherited the police. Even in
the Finance Ministry the system appears to have been
continued within a Japanese style framework, even
though the new government had to cope with massive
inflation and the conversion from the Japanese
currency to a Korean currency.
Contrast this with the situation in North Korea. North
Korea did not control any of the former central
government or records higher than provincial records.
Even if North Korea had wished to set up a
government paralleling that in South Korea the
personnel did not exist in the North. In the North quite
different traditions could emerge in the bureaucracy.
Once the Korean war had begun it was clear new
institutions would be required. A new ministry, the
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Ministry for Reconstruction, was created in 1951, and
new financial institutions, notably the Korean
Reconstruction Bank (apparently modelled on the
Japanese Reconstruction Bank of 1945) now the
Korean Development Bank. The Ministry of Recon-
struction was to be not so much a planning ministry as
an implementation ministry.
This was to be the key characteristic of the Korean
governmental system, that all ministries were
implementing ministries first and planning ministries
second. Even when planning came into fashion in the
1960s planning and implementation were never
separated. In the subsequent sections it will be seen
that even planning does not come from the top, and
implementation never does.
The Park Reforms
The system of the 1950s did not produce high growth.
What was lacking was essentially the drive to
economise, the sense of economic development as
being the major priority, and it was this goal which
Park Chung-hee introduced. It is important to
contrast this desire with the situation in many other
developing countries where the elite already enjoy a
high standard of living and the desire for national
economic development takes second priority to a
comfortable life. What is needed is the strong sense of
economic nationalism which was the contribution of
Park Chung-hee.
From the structural point of view what was needed
was a strong overlord planning ministry and an
overlord implementation ministry, the Economic
Planning Board (EPB) and the Ministry of Con-
struction. Unlike so many countries, planning was not
to be placed in an advisory agency, but at the core of
the ministry which would also handle the budget,
foreign aid and loans (since the balance of payments
was the major constraint) and control the collection of
national statistics. These functions were collected
from various ministries to form the EPB whose head
would always be the Deputy Prime Minister.
The Ministry of Construction came in 1963 using a
translation of the Japanese legislation setting up the
Japanese Ministry of Construction. This would be
charged with national physical planning and con-
struction itself, uniquely having provincial offices of
construction.
One further move was to create immediately industry
associations at a level corresponding to SITC 4 digit
industrial classification. These look very like the 'Self
Control Associations' of the Japanese wartime
economy [Johnson 1982: 162-51 except that by making
them four digit rather than three digit, they are much
less powerful and more subservient to government
pressure. In the later 1960s it became clear that this
was an inefficient level, and for key industries such as
machinery and textiles two or three digit organisations
were created.
Who Makes the Economic Decisions?
The description given so far suggests a complicated
system of government agencies operating within a
cultural and historical context which gives individual
bureaucrats considerable freedom of action. It is
argued that the Korean Government is very far from
being a monolithic and hierarchial organisation. This
is not to say that it cannot, on occasion, function like
one, but that it cannot sustain the effort. In the
Weberian sense one does not find a hierarchy working
'by assigning work and validating along a descending
scale through the organisation'.
If one attempts a typology of decision-making this
statement becomes clearer.
National goals
In the broadest sense these come from the top.
However, in the broadest sense they are merely
slogans. In most cases these national goals come from
a wide range of sources including, in each five year
plan, a very wide consultation process which is then
passed to the Council of Ministers and finally the
Council of State for approval and validation, but in
both cases this is a formality.
National policy
The President may indeed be concerned about
inflation, but will direct ministers to work out plans,
who will in turn direct their subordinates to work out a
plan in the process described below. In 1978-79
pressure came from a group outside the Blue House to
put control of inflation as a top priority.
Sectoral plans
Will normally be worked out by the appropriate
ministry in conjunction with the relevant quasi-
governmental agencies.
Implementation
Will be left to lower officials and not normally
interferred with, which allows a wide range of
informal consultation to take place.
If the small number of central government personnel
were the reason for much of the decentralised
decision-making, preventing senior men from having
time to formulate and control policy, this still does not
explain why the Koreans choose to run their
organisation as they do. Given the status attached to
the bureaucracy, it could have been allowed to expand
to gargantuan proportions. Or it would still have been
possible for the junior officials to defer to their seniors
for every decision. This would of course have slowed
the whole decision-taking procss, but would have
ensured a sense of hierarchy.
The important fact is that by tradition the Korean
official is allowed a high degree of autonomy. This is
sanctioned both by the indigenous Korean tradition
and the Japanese tradition. It is quite common for a
junior to impose difficulties on a member of the public
within the hearing of his superior without any
intervention. It appears improper for a senior to
inquire uninvited into the activities of a junior. The
Korean official has a degree of independence of
decision-making which perhaps only the immigration
official has in the British civil service.
However there is not quite the same loss of face
involved in being forced to change a decision by a
superior when an appeal is made to a higher level as in
Japan. In this sense the Korean accepts that hierarchy
does exist. In Japan it is common for companies to
await the rotation of an obstinate official rather than
appeal to a superior.
It is the Assistant Director (grade 4) who makes most
of the day to day decisions in the government. It is
openly acknowledged that it is the assistant director
who 'really decides policy'. There were about 4,200
grade 4 officials in central government in 1974. It is
this group who will draw up most policy measures.
These measures will have little to do with neoclassical
precepts, being conditioned by the dominant ethos of
economic nationalism. The briefing to higher officials
will be in terms of ouri nara, (our country - a key
nationalist phrase in Korean thinking) and either
targets already set or international comparisons.
For major policies the decisions taken at assistant
director level will be presented in briefings by higher
officials. The briefings take a standard form. On each
page no more than three issues may be introduced as
Chinese character headlines. The normal briefing
would take the form of the problem (sub-divided into
three sections), the situation (likewise divided), the
desired goal and the appropriate policy measures. As
many pages of tables as appropriate may be placed
between these basic pages.
One major problem is that the Chinese headlines are
ambiguous and so brief as to amount generally to
empty boxes or tautologies at the level of 'inflation is
caused by monetary factors'. The actual content of
policy instruments therefore has to be drawn up at the
more junior level. Of course policy may descend from
above, as in the case of the Park reforms of 1961 or the
Chon reforms of 1980: But to take the case of the
March 1979 Stabilisation Measures, the direction
came from the Department of the Prime Minister
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(DPM) in January that inflation must stop, but it took
two months of hard work by the junior levels to work
out a set of policies with this end. This involved
consultation between all the economic ministries as
well as major quasi-governmental agencies such as
KECO (Korea Electric Company) and non-economic
agencies such as the KCIA (Korean Central
Intelligence Agency).
Decisions which could not be resolved by the assistant
directors and directors liaising between different
ministries and agencies would be settled by the
Council of Economic Ministers and then placed before
the President. In this process the Cabinet is not an
important decision-making level.
Nor, after a decision is taken, do the consenting
ministries necessarily implement it. They may delay,
renege or readjust according to sectional protests
without going back to the Council or even making
public statements. Perhaps the best example was the
resistance of the MAF to importing vegetables to meet
the shortfall in 1978, so that in the end the only option
was to use another government agency, OSROK
(Office of Supply).
The answer to the question, who makes economic
decisions, is therefore extremely complex and needs a
case by case examination. 'The government' is never
an adequate answer. The Ministry is rarely an
adequate answer, since it will normally be a particular
division of a particular bureau. In that division there
will be one man charged with that responsibility.
Obviously where the decision relies on implementation
in the provinces, or at a local level different criteria
apply. Direct implementation agencies such as NACF
will be able, if the need arises, to mobilise a large
number of officials.
The pressures on assistant directors do not only come
from within the government. They are, as explained
above, part of a web of loyalties, family, various
alumni, personal and professional friendships. Thus if
the implementation affects either the private or public
sector, interest groups will lobby that official directly
or personally known superiors rather than pressure
groups. Non-direct pressure can be counterproductive,
one assistant director even claiming 'every time I get a
phone call from the Blue House I feel less inclined to
comply'.
The informal system of personal relationships cuts
across formal structures, government/business
divisions in a way which in other countries would lead
to widespread corruption. How is it that widespread
corruption is avoided? The answer is basically through
eternal vigilance and through the strong inculcation of
economic nationalism - the will to industrialise' -
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into all levels of the government. In the fight against
corruption the activities of the Board of Audit and
Inspection which reports directly to the President and
may swoop at any moment on any government
ministry or quasi agency are particularly important.
Conclusion
The Korean system is therefore part planned and part
the outgrowth of tradition. This preliminary account
goes a long way to contradict the initial impression of
a hierarchical and 'hard' state. Bureaucratic it
certainly is, but the system proves highly flexible,
allowing consultation at all levels and the prevention
of stupid rules getting in the way of progress.
Of course 4,200 officials at grade 4 level or 12,000 over
allis not a large number in the context of a nation of
30-40 million. There is still an elite which has
preserved the crucial Yi dynasty distinction, not
between grades of the hierarchy but between the elite
and the masses. The 12,000 officials are complemented
by another 50,000 in other government agencies and
perhaps 50,000 in the private sector, a small enough
elite to operate on a face to face basis when necessary,
but a large number to be consulted on policy.
If all this is accurate, where then is the distinctiveness
which made the Government of Korea such a
powerful agent of development? The distinctiveness
lies in several different and even contradictory
sources:
the national consensus that economic develop-
ment is paramount, beyond the interests of individual
companies or power groups. If this creative
nationalism were not deeply rooted in the civil service,
all the potentially damaging aspects of the system
described above would be actualised;
the blurring of distinction between civil service
and business so that at one moment a civil servant may
act as a spokesman for private business and the next a
private businessman may become an agent of
government policy;
the ability to change the nature of the structure
where quick decisions are required when the fiction of
a rigid hierarchy becomes a fact, for instance to raise
oil prices immediately and not shelter consumers or
other vested interests;
decentralisation of decision-making, the fact
that an assistant director can make most decisions
without reference to his immediate superior can
prevent administrative delay;
y) the willingness of the government to intervene
whenever it felt national development would be
enhanced, without regard for theoretical or ideological
points.
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